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1、StrategicInformationTransmissionModelsPreliminaryLectureNotesHongbinCaiandXiWengDepartmentofAppliedEconomics,GuanghuaSchoolofManagementPekingUniversityOctober2011Contents1CheapTalk21.1ModelSetting...................................21.2AMotivatingExample..............................31.
2、3ContinuousStateSpace.............................71.4OptimalCommunicationMechanism......................102DisclosureGames:VeriableTalk142.1AMotivatingExample..............................152.2SkepticismandUnraveling............................1711CheapTalkIngametheory,cheaptalkiscom
3、municationbetweenplayerswhichdoesnotdirectlyaectthepayosofthegame.ThisisincontrasttoSpencer'ssignalingmodelinwhichsendingcertainmessagesmaybecostlyforthesenderdependingonthestateoftheworld.Theclassicexampleisofanexperttryingtoexplainthestateoftheworldtoanuninformeddecisionmaker.Thede
4、cisionmaker,afterhearingthereportfromtheexpert,mustthenmakeadecisionwhichaectsthepayosofbothplayers.TheclassicalmodelofcheaptalkisintroducedbyCrawfordandSobel(1982).Realexamplesofcheaptalkinclude:1.Monetarymystique":Acentralbankisunwillingtomakeprecisestatementsaboutitspolicyobjecti
5、ves.2.Securityanalystrecommendations.3.RatingAgency.1.1ModelSettingTherearetwoplayers,aSender(S)andaReceiver(R)ofinformation.Sholdssomeprivateinformationaboutapayo-relevantstate.ThetimingofthegameisspeciedinFigure1.2012SprivatelySsendsaRtakesanactionobservesmessagem?Ma?AthestateoftoR
6、theworlds?SFigure1:TimelineoftheCheapTalkGamePayos:PayosareUS(a;s)andUR(a;s).Inparticular,wewillusequadraticutilityfunctions:S2R2U(a;s)=