資源描述：
《Equilibrium political budget cycles 》由會員上傳分享，免費在線閱讀，更多相關(guān)內(nèi)容在學(xué)術(shù)論文-天天文庫。
1、NBERWORKINGPAPERSERIESEQUILIBRIUMPOLITICALBUDGETCYCLESKennethRogoffWorkingPaperNo.2428NATIONALBUREAUOFECONOMICRESEARCH1050MassachusettsAvenueCambridge,MA02138November1987SupportfromtheLyndeandHarryBradleyFoundationisgratefullyacknowledged.TheresearchreportedhereispartoftheNBER'sresearchprograminFina
2、ncialMarketsandMonetaryEconomics.AnyopinionsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorandnotthoseoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch.NBERWorkingPaper#2428November1987EquilibriumPoliticalBudgetCyclesABSTRACTPriortoelections,governments(atalllevels)frequentlyundertakeaconsumptionbinge.Taxesarecut,transfersarerais
3、ed,andgovernmentspendingisdistortedtowardshighlyvisibleitems.The"politicalbusinesscycle"(betterbethoughtofas"thepoliticalbudgetcycle")hasbeenintensivelyexamined,atleastforthecaseofnationalelections.Anumberofproposalshavebeenadvancedformitigatingelectoralcyclesinfiscalpolicy.Thepresentpaperisthefirst
4、efforttoprovideafully-specifiedequilibriumframeworkforanalyzingsuchproposals.Apoliticalbudgetcycleariseshereviaamultidimensionalsignallingprocess,inwhichincumbentleaderstrytoconvincevotersthattheyhaverecentlybeendoinganexcellentjobinadministeringthegovernment.Effortstomitigatethecyclecaneasilyprovec
5、ounterproductive,eitherbyimpedingthetransmissionofinfor-mationorbyinducingpoliticianstoselectmorecostlywaysofsignalling.Themodelalsoindicatesnewdirectionsforempiricalresearch.KennethRogoffEconomicsDepartment1180ObservatoryDriveUniversityofWisconsinMadison,WI53706(608)-263—38761I.IntroductionEconomis
6、tsandpoliticalscientistshavetriedforsometimetounderstandtheapparentcoincidenceofmacroeconomicpolicycyclesandelections.Butalthoughresearchershavedetectedsomenotableempiricalregularities1(parti-cularlyconcerningpre—electiontaxcutsandgovernmentspendingincreases),progresshasbeenimpededbythelackofasolidt
7、heoreticalfoundation.Thepresentpaperisanefforttoremedythissituation.Myanalysisisbasedonanintertemporalequilibriummodelinwhichbothvotersandpoliticiansarerational,utility-maximizingagents.2A"politicalbu
