theimpact_of_corporate_governance_on_auditor_choiceevidence_from_china英

theimpact_of_corporate_governance_on_auditor_choiceevidence_from_china英

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時間:2018-04-22

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1、JournalofInternationalAccounting,AuditingandTaxation18(2009)44-59ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirectJournalofInternationalAccounting,AuditingandTaxationTheimpactofcorporategovernanceonauditorchoice:EvidencefromChinaZ.JunLin3'12,MingLiubaDepartmentofAccountancyandLaw,HongKongBaptistUniversity,Kowl

2、ongTong,Kowloon,HongKong,ChinabDepartmentofAccountingandInformationManagement,TheUniversityofMacau,Macau,ChinaARTICLEINFOABSTRACTKeywords:Asthelargestandfastestgrowingemergingmarket,ChinaisbecomingmoreCorporategovernanceandmoreimportanttoinvestorsthroughouttheworld.ThepurposeofthisAuditorchoicepape

3、ristoinvestigatethedeterminantsoffirms'auditorchoiceinChinainChinesecapitalmarketOpaquenessrespectoftheircorporategovernancemechanism.Normallyfirmshavetotakegainsatrade-offintheirauditorchoicedecisions,i.e.,tohirehigh-qualityauditorstosignaleffectiveauditmonitoringandgoodcorporategovernancetolowert

4、heircapitalraisingcosts,ortoselectlow-qualityauditorswithlesseffectiveauditmonitoringinordertoreapprivatebenefitsderivedfromweakcorporategovernanceandless-transparentdisclosure(theopaquenessgains).Wedevelopalogitregressionmodeltotesttheimpactoffirms'internalcorporategovernancemechanismonauditorchoi

5、cedecisionsmadebyIPOfirmsgettinglistedduringabearmarketperiodof2001-2004inChina.Threevariablesareusedtoproxyforfirms'internalcorporategovernancemechanism,i.e.,theownershipconcentration,thesizeofthesupervisoryboard(SB),andthedualityofCEOandchairmanofboardofdirectors(BoDs).WeclassifyallauditorsinChin

6、aintolargeauditors(Top10)andothers(non-Top10),assumingthelargeauditorscanprovidehigherqualityauditservices.Theempiricalresultsshowthatfirmswithlargercontrollingshareholders,withsmallersizeofSB,orinwhichCEOandBoDschairmanarethesameperson,arelesslikelytohireaTop10(high-quality)auditor.Thissuggeststha

7、twhenbenefitsfromloweringcapitalraisingcostsaretrivial,firmswithweakerinternalcorporategovernancemechanismareinclinedtochoosealow-qualityauditorsoastocaptureandsustaintheiropaquenessgains.Ontheotherhand,wit

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