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《上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系研究》由會(huì)員上傳分享，免費(fèi)在線閱讀，更多相關(guān)內(nèi)容在學(xué)術(shù)論文-天天文庫(kù)。
1、上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系研究專業(yè)：管理科學(xué)與工程碩士生：林棟良指導(dǎo)老師：扶青副教授摘要本文主要研究我國(guó)上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系問(wèn)題，目的是為了揭示我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果。通過(guò)對(duì)比高管持股企業(yè)和零持股企業(yè)兩者的績(jī)效，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)2003．2007年間，兩者總體上不存在顯著差異，這是因?yàn)槌止善髽I(yè)中普遍存在“低持股’’現(xiàn)象，過(guò)低的持股水平?jīng)]有起到應(yīng)有的激勵(lì)作用。當(dāng)把所有上市公司樣本分為持股比例大于等于0．05％和小于0．05％兩部分時(shí)，高持股企業(yè)的績(jī)效顯著優(yōu)于低持股企業(yè)，這說(shuō)明了高管持股比例總體提高有助于提高企業(yè)總體績(jī)效。通過(guò)對(duì)20
2、03．2007五年間高管持股比例大于等于0．05％的上市公司面板數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)：高管持股比例、董事會(huì)持股比例與企業(yè)績(jī)效成非線性關(guān)系，除董事成員外的高級(jí)經(jīng)理持股比例對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效沒有影響；這說(shuō)明了企業(yè)對(duì)不同激勵(lì)對(duì)象的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果不同，同一激勵(lì)對(duì)象持股比例的不同對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響也不同。通過(guò)對(duì)上市公司2003．2007五年平均數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)高管持股對(duì)企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期績(jī)效沒有促進(jìn)作用。這說(shuō)明了在制度缺失的情況下，高管持股沒有起到長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)作用。最后，本文結(jié)合股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論和我國(guó)上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)規(guī)章制度對(duì)上述實(shí)證結(jié)果作出了相應(yīng)的解釋。關(guān)鍵詞：高管持股，企
3、業(yè)績(jī)效，股權(quán)激勵(lì)Theresearchontherelationshipbetweenexecutiveequityincentiveandthelistedcompanies’performancesMajor：ManagementScienceandEngineeringName：LinDongliangSupervisor：AssociateProf．FuQingABSTRACTInordertorevealtheeffectofexecutiveequityincentiveinlistedcompanies，Imakearesearchonth
4、erelationshipbetweenmanagementshareholdingandlistedcompanies’performancesinthispaper．Bycomparingmanagementshareholdingcompaniesandnon-shareholdingcompanies，Ifoundthattheirperformancesarenosignificantdifferencebetween2003and2007．Thereasonforthisismanagementholdsleastequityinmostsh
5、areholdingcompanies．Whenallcompaniesaredividedintotwoparts：110lessthan0．05percentandlessthan0．05percent,Ifoundtheperformancesinthehighpercentageshareholdingofcompaniesalesuperiortolowpercentageshareholdingcompanies．Thatmeanpromotetheproportionofmanagementshareholdingwillhelpimpro
6、veoverallcompaniesperformances．Throughananalysisofpaneldatacombinedmorethan0．05％shareholdingofthecompaniesbetween2003and2007，Ifoundthatmanagementshareholding，theBoardofDirectorsshareholdingholdanon—linearrelationshipwitllcompanies’seniormanager’Sshareholdinghasrioimpactoncompanie
7、s’performances．Thisshowsdifferentincentiveobjectsanddifferentshareholdingratiosmakedifferenteffectsoncompanies’performances．Throughtheanalysisofaveragefive—yeardataoflistedcompanies，managementshareholdingCall’taffectthelong-termcompanies’performances．ManagementⅡownershipdoesnotpl
8、ayaroleinlong—termincentivesbecauseofman
