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1、上市公司高管股權激勵與企業(yè)績效關系研究專業(yè):管理科學與工程碩士生:林棟良指導老師:扶青副教授摘要本文主要研究我國上市公司高管股權激勵與企業(yè)績效關系問題,目的是為了揭示我國上市公司實施高管股權激勵的效果。通過對比高管持股企業(yè)和零持股企業(yè)兩者的績效,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)2003.2007年間,兩者總體上不存在顯著差異,這是因為持股企業(yè)中普遍存在“低持股’’現(xiàn)象,過低的持股水平?jīng)]有起到應有的激勵作用。當把所有上市公司樣本分為持股比例大于等于0.05%和小于0.05%兩部分時,高持股企業(yè)的績效顯著優(yōu)于低持股企業(yè),這說明了高管持股比例總體提高有助于提高企業(yè)總體績效。通過對20
2、03.2007五年間高管持股比例大于等于0.05%的上市公司面板數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析,本文發(fā)現(xiàn):高管持股比例、董事會持股比例與企業(yè)績效成非線性關系,除董事成員外的高級經(jīng)理持股比例對企業(yè)績效沒有影響;這說明了企業(yè)對不同激勵對象的股權激勵效果不同,同一激勵對象持股比例的不同對企業(yè)績效的影響也不同。通過對上市公司2003.2007五年平均數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)高管持股對企業(yè)長期績效沒有促進作用。這說明了在制度缺失的情況下,高管持股沒有起到長期激勵作用。最后,本文結合股權激勵理論和我國上市公司治理結構、股權激勵規(guī)章制度對上述實證結果作出了相應的解釋。關鍵詞:高管持股,企
3、業(yè)績效,股權激勵Theresearchontherelationshipbetweenexecutiveequityincentiveandthelistedcompanies’performancesMajor:ManagementScienceandEngineeringName:LinDongliangSupervisor:AssociateProf.FuQingABSTRACTInordertorevealtheeffectofexecutiveequityincentiveinlistedcompanies,Imakearesearchonth
4、erelationshipbetweenmanagementshareholdingandlistedcompanies’performancesinthispaper.Bycomparingmanagementshareholdingcompaniesandnon-shareholdingcompanies,Ifoundthattheirperformancesarenosignificantdifferencebetween2003and2007.Thereasonforthisismanagementholdsleastequityinmostsh
5、areholdingcompanies.Whenallcompaniesaredividedintotwoparts:110lessthan0.05percentandlessthan0.05percent,Ifoundtheperformancesinthehighpercentageshareholdingofcompaniesalesuperiortolowpercentageshareholdingcompanies.Thatmeanpromotetheproportionofmanagementshareholdingwillhelpimpro
6、veoverallcompaniesperformances.Throughananalysisofpaneldatacombinedmorethan0.05%shareholdingofthecompaniesbetween2003and2007,Ifoundthatmanagementshareholding,theBoardofDirectorsshareholdingholdanon—linearrelationshipwitllcompanies’seniormanager’Sshareholdinghasrioimpactoncompanie
7、s’performances.Thisshowsdifferentincentiveobjectsanddifferentshareholdingratiosmakedifferenteffectsoncompanies’performances.Throughtheanalysisofaveragefive—yeardataoflistedcompanies,managementshareholdingCall’taffectthelong-termcompanies’performances.ManagementⅡownershipdoesnotpl
8、ayaroleinlong—termincentivesbecauseofman