[博弈論書籍].games.and.information

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1、GAMESANDINFORMATION,FOURTHEDITIONAnIntroductiontoGameTheoryEricRasmusenBasilBlackwellvContents1(starredsectionsarelessimportant)ListofFiguresListofTablesPrefaceContentsandPurposeChangesintheSecondEditionChangesintheThirdEditionUsingtheBookTheLevelofMathematicsOtherBooksConta

2、ctInformationAcknowledgementsIntroductionHistoryGameTheory’sMethodExemplifyingTheoryThisBook’sStyleNotesPART1:GAMETHEORY1TheRulesoftheGame1.1De?nitions1.2DominantStrategies:ThePrisoner’sDilemma1.3IteratedDominance:TheBattleoftheBismarckSea1.4NashEquilibrium:BoxedPigs,TheBatt

3、leoftheSexes,andRankedCoordina-tion1.5FocalPointsNotesProblems1xxxFebruary2,2000.December12,2003.24March2005.EricRasmusen,Erasmuse@indiana.edu.http://www.rasmusen.org/GIFootnotesstartingwithxxxaretheauthor’snotestohimself.Commentsarewelcomed.vi2Information2.1TheStrategicandE

4、xtensiveFormsofaGame2.2InformationSets2.3Perfect,Certain,Symmetric,andCompleteInformation2.4TheHarsanyiTransformationandBayesianGames2.5Example:ThePngSettlementGameNotesProblems3MixedandContinuousStrategies3.1MixedStrategies:TheWelfareGame3.2Chicken,TheWarofAttrition,andCorr

5、elatedStrategies3.3MixedStrategieswithGeneralParametersandNPlayers:TheCivicDutyGame3.4Di?erentUsesofMixingandRandomizing:MinimaxandtheAuditingGame3.5ContinuousStrategies:TheCournotGame3.6ContinuousStrategies:TheBertrandGame,StrategicComplements,andStrate-gicSubsitutes3.7Exis

6、tenceofEquilibriumNotesProblems4DynamicGameswithSymmetricInformation4.1SubgamePerfectness4.2AnExampleofPerfectness:EntryDeterrenceI4.3CredibleThreats,SunkCosts,andtheOpen-SetProblemintheGameofNui-sanceSuits*4.4RecoordinationtoPareto-dominantEquilibriainSubgames:ParetoPerfect

7、ionNotesProblems5ReputationandRepeatedGameswithSymmetricInformation5.1FinitelyRepeatedGamesandtheChainstoreParadox5.2In?nitelyRepeatedGames,MinimaxPunishments,andtheFolkTheorem5.3Reputation:theOne-sidedPrisoner’sDilemma5.4ProductQualityinanIn?nitelyRepeatedGamevii*5.5MarkovE

8、quilibriaandOverlappingGenerationsintheGameofCustomerSwitch-ingCosts*5.6Evo