[博弈論書籍].games.and.information,an.introduction.to.game.theory(3th),eric rasmusen,basil blackwell

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1、GAMESANDINFORMATION,THIRDEDITIONAnIntroductiontoGameTheoryEricRasmusenBasilBlackwell1Contents1(starredsectionsarelessimportant)PrefaceContentsandPurposeChangesintheSecondEditionChangesintheThirdEditionUsingtheBookTheLevelofMathematicsOtherBooksAcknowledgementsIntroductionHistoryGameTheory'sMethod

2、ExemplifyingTheoryThisBook'sStyleNotesPARTIGAMETHEORY1TheRulesoftheGame1.1Deˉnitions1.2DominantStrategies:ThePrisoner'sDilemma1.3IteratedDominance:TheBattleoftheBismarckSea1.4NashEquilibrium:BoxedPigs,TheBattleoftheSexes,andRankedCoordination1xxxFebruary2,2000.EricRasmusen,Erasmuse@indiana.edu.Fo

3、otnotesstartingwithxxxaretheauthor'snotestohimself.Commentsarewelcomed.21.5FocalPointsNotesProblems2Information2.1TheExtensiveFormofaGame2.2InformationSets2.3Perfect,Certain,Symmetric,andCompleteInformation2.4TheHarsanyiTransformationandBayesianGames*2.5Example:ThePngSettlementGameNotesProblems3C

4、ontinuousandMixedStrategies3.1MixedStrategies:TheWelfareGame3.2Chicken,TheWarofAttrition,andCorrelatedStrategies3.3MixedStrategieswithGeneralParametersandNPlayers:TheCivicDutyGame3.4RandomizingversusMixing:TheAuditingGame3.5ContinuousStrategies:TheCournotGameNotesProblems4DynamicGameswithSymmetri

5、cInformation4.1SubgamePerfectness4.2AnExampleofPerfectness:EntryDeterrenceI34.3CredibleThreats,SunkCosts,andtheOpen-SetProbleminNui-sanceSuits4.4RecoordinationtoParetoDominantEquilibriainSubgames:ParetoPerfectionNotesProblems5ReputationandRepeatedGames5.1FinitelyRepeatedGamesandtheChainstoreParad

6、ox5.2InˉnitelyRepeatedGames,MinimaxPunishments,andtheFolkTheorem5.3Reputation:TheOne-SidedPrisoner'sDilemma5.4ProductQualityinanInˉnitelyRepeatedGame*5.5MarkovEquilibriaandOverlappingGenerationsinCustomerSwitch-ingCosts*5.6EvolutionaryEquilibrium:TheHawk-DoveGame(formerlySec-tion4.6)NotesProblems

7、6DynamicGameswithIncompleteInformation6.1PerfectBayesianEquilibrium:EntryDeterrenceIIandIII6.2ReˉningPerfectBayesianEquilibrium:PhDAdmissions6.3TheImportanceofCommonKnowledge:EntryDeterrenceIVandV6.4IncompleteInformati