Bargaining Power in Repeated Negotiations with Outside Options

Bargaining Power in Repeated Negotiations with Outside Options

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1、BargainingPowerinRepeatedNegotiationswithOutsideOptionsChristianGrohDepartmentofEconomicsUniversityofMannheimL13,15,D-68131Mannheim,GermanyTel.:++491813421email:groh@econ.uni-mannheim.deDecember20,1999AbstractForrepeatedultimatumbargaining,theFolkTh

2、eoremofrepeatedgamethe-orysuggeststhattherearemanyequilibria,amongthemequilibriainwhichthesecondmover,say,thebuyer,appropriatesallthesurplus.Thispapershowsthatthepresenceofoutsideoptionsinformofalternativetradingpartnerseliminatessomeoftheseequilibri

3、abyreducingthecopeforextractingsurplusinrepeatedbargaining.Thestructureofoptimalequilibriaischaracterized.Keywords:noncooperativebargaining,repeatedgames,outsideoptionsJELClassi cation:C78,C73,C72ThispaperwaspartlywrittenwhiletheauthorwasvisitingUni

4、versityCollegeLondonwhosewarmhospitalityisgratefullyacknowledged.IamespeciallygratefultoTilmanBorgersandMartinHellwigfortheirencouragementsandgenerousadvice.Ihavealsobene tedfromthecommentsofMalteCherdron,TonyCurzon-Price,PhilippeJehielandEnnioStacch

5、etti.Allremainingerrorsaremine.1IntroductionInthisandthecompanionpaper(Groh[10])Iinvestigatemarketpowerandcollusioninsituationsinvolvingbilateralbargaining.Marketpowerandcollusionareusuallystudiedinmodelswithhomogenousmarkets,i.e.theCournotmodelorthe

6、Betrandmodel.Incontrast,mytransactionsarebasedonbilateralbargainingwith"markets"providingoutsideoptionsintheformofnewtradingpartners.Iconsiderrepeatednegotiatonsforrepeatedone-shottransactions.TheanalysisiscomplicatedbytheFolkTheoremofrepeatedgamethe

7、orywhichsuggeststhatevenintheabsenceofoutsideoptionstherearemanyequilibria,inparticularequilibriainwhichthebuyercanextractallthesurplusfromanagreement.Startingfromthisobservationthepresentpaperanalyseshowtheabilitytoextractsurplusisa ectedbythepresen

8、ceofothermarketparticipants,inparticulartheabilitytotradeonepartnero againsttheother.InthecompanionpaperIdiscussthescopeforcollusioninthissetting.Iintroducethebasicmodelinsection2.Thegameisconstructedsothatineachone-shottransactionmarketpowerrestswit

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