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1、Econometrica,Vol.70,No.6(November,2002),2421–2453INFORMATIONALSIZEANDINCENTIVECOMPATIBILITYByRichardMcLeanandAndrewPostlewaite1Weexamineageneralequilibriummodelwithasymmetricallyinformedagents.Thepresenceofasymmetricinformationgenerallypresentsacon?ictbetweenincentivecom-pati
2、bilityandParetoef?ciency.Wepresentanotionofinformationalsizeandshowthatthecon?ictbetweenincentivecompatibilityandef?ciencycanbemadearbitrarilysmallifagentsareofsuf?cientlysmallinformationalsize.Keywords:Incentivecompatibility,mechanismdesign,incompleteinformation.1introducti
3、onTheincompatibilityofParetoef?ciencyandincentivecompatibilityisacentralthemeineconomicsandgametheory.Theissuesassociatedwiththisincompatibilityareparticularlyimportantinthedesignofresourceallocationmechanismsinthepresenceofasymmetricallyinformedagentswheretheneedtoacquireinf
4、ormationfromagentsinordertocomputeef?cientoutcomesandtheincentivesagentshavetomisrepresentthatinformationforpersonalgaincomeintocon?ict.Despitealargeliteraturethatfocusesontheseissues,therehasbeenlittleworkaimedatunderstandingthosesituationsinwhichinformationalasymmetriesareq
5、uantitativelyimportant.Virtuallyeverytransactionischaracterizedbysomeasymmetryofinformation:anyinvestorwhobuysorsellsashareofstockgenerallyknowssomethingrel-evanttothevalueofthesharethatisnotknowntothepersonontheothersideofthetransaction.Inordertofocusonmoresalientaspectsofth
6、eproblem,manymodels(rightly)ignoretheincentiveproblemsassociatedwithinforma-tionalasymmetriesinthebeliefthat,fortheproblemathand,agentsare“infor-mationallysmall.”However,fewresearchershaveinvestigatedthecircumstancesunderwhichananalysisthatignorestheseincentiveproblemswillyie
7、ldresultssimilartothoseobtainedwhentheseproblemsarefullyaccountedfor.Inthispaper,westudyaclassofmechanismdesignproblems.Ourgoalistoformalizeinformationalsizeinawaythat,whenagentsareinformationallysmall,1Earlyversionsofthispapercirculatedunderthetitles“InformationalSmallnessan
8、dParetoEf?-ciency”and“InformationalSmallnessandIncentiveCompatibilit
