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1、8InformationalAsymmetryandContractDesignThethemeofthischapterisinformationalasymmetry,whichisnotthesameasthedifferencesofbeliefsconsideredatvariouspointsinearlierchapters.Beliefsmaydifferwithouttherebeingaconsensusthatanysinglepersonsopinionsareintrinsicallysuperiortoanyoneelses.Insom
2、esituations,however,itwillbecleartoallpartiesinvolvedthatsomeofthemarebetterinformedthanothers.Whenaprincipalemploysanagenttocarryoutactionswhoseoutcomesareuncertainforexample,whenanabsenteelandlordengagesafarmmanagerthelatterwillevidentlybeinabetterpositiontoknowaboutanyshirkingoropp
3、ortunisticbehaviorhechoosestoengagein.Asanotherexample,anexpertjewelerwillevidentlybemorefamiliarwiththequalityofthediamondsheoffersforsalethanwillanordinaryprospectivepurchaser.Wewillbeconsideringthe?rsttypeofsituationinSection8.1undertheheadingofhiddenactionsormoralhazard.Sections8.
4、2and8.3exploreaspectsofthesecondtypeofsituation,theproblemofhiddenknowledgeoradverseselection.Ineachcasethechallengefacingthelesser-informedpartyistodesignanincentivescheme(acontract)aimedatmitigatingtheeffectsofinformationalasymmetry.1Theprimaryfocusinthischapterwillbeonthechoicesmad
5、e(thecontractsdesigned)byalesswell-informeddecisionmakerorprincipalwhohasmonopolypower.Inthecaseofhiddenactions,introducingcompetitionamongprincipalsaffectstheanalysisinonlyaminorway(seeExercise8.1.2).Ontheotherhand,inthecaseofhiddenknowledge,whenanumberofless-informedtransactorscompe
6、tewithoneanother,subtleissuesariseregardingthenatureofequilibrium.ForthisreasonwedeferadiscussionofcompetitionandhiddenknowledgeuntilChapter9.1InChapter5weconsideredthesituationofadecisionmakerwhoemploysanexpert.Thatdiscussionaddressedonlytheproblemofsincerity,howtoinducetheexperttoac
7、curatelyrevealhishiddenknowledge.3088.1HiddenActions(“MoralHazard”)andContractDesign3098.1HiddenActions(“MoralHazard”)andContractDesign2Supposeanabsenteelandlord(theprincipal)hiresafarmmanagerashisagent.TheagentsutilityfunctionisvA(c,x),whereheractionisx(whichwemaythinkofashereffort)a
8、ndher
