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1、PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearchVol.LXIX,No.1,July2004ThePhenomenologyofCognitionOrWhatIsItLiketoThinkThatP?DAVIDPITTCaliforniaStateUniversity,LosAngelesAnumberofphilosophersendorse,withoutargument,theviewthatthere’ssomethingit’slikeconsciouslytothinkthatp,whichisdistinctfromwhatit’
2、slikeconsciouslytothinkthatq.Thisthesis,iftrue,wouldhaveimportantconsequencesforphilosophyofmindandcognitivescience.InthispaperIoffertwoargumentsforit.Thefirstargumentclaimsitwouldbeimpossibleintrospectivelytodistinguishconsciousthoughtswithrespecttotheircontentifthereweren’tsomethingit’
3、sliketothinkthem.Thisargumentisdefendedagainstseveralobjections.ThesecondargumentuseswhatIcall“minimalpair”experiences—sentencesreadwithoutandwithunderstanding—toinduceinthereaderanexperienceofthekindIclaimexists.Furtherobjectsareconsideredandrebutted.Itisatraditionalassumptioninanalytic
4、philosophyofmindthatintentionalstates,suchasbelieving,doubtingorwonderingthatp,havenointrinsicphenomenalproperties,andthatphenomenalstates,suchasfeelingpain,seeingredorhearingmiddleC,havenointrinsicintentionalproperties.Weare,accordingtothisview,oftwometaphysicallydistinctminds,theintent
5、ionalandthephenomenal.Bothoftheseassumptionshavebeenchallengedintherecentliterature.Block(1996),Loar(2001),Peacocke(1992)andTye(1995),forexample,havearguedthatpurelyphenomenal,nonconceptualstateshaveintentional(orproto-intentional)properties.Andafairnumberofphilosophersandpsychologists,e
6、.g.,Baars(1988),Chalmers(1996),Flanagan(1992),Goldman(1993),HorganandTienson(2002),Jackendoff(1987),Kobes(1995),Langsam(2000),Levine(1993;1995),Loar(1987;1998),McGinn(1992),McCulloch(1999),Moore(1962),Peacocke(1998),Schweizer(1994),Searle(1990),Siewert(1998)andStrawson(1994),haveexpresse
7、dtheviewthatconsciousintentionalstateshavequalitativecharacter.THEPHENOMENOLOGYOFCOGNITION1Thispaperconcernsthelatterthesis.Itisnotablethat,thoughapparentlywidelyendorsed,ithasnot1beenwidelyarguedfor.Perhapsthosewhothinkitistruethinkitissimplytooobvioustorequireargument.Y
