a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets

a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets

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時(shí)間:2018-02-10

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1、ASUPPLYANDDEMANDFRAMEWORKFORTWO-SIDEDMATCHINGMARKETSEDUARDOM.AZEVEDOANDJACOBD.LESHNOAbstract.Weproposeanewmodeloftwo-sidedmatchingmarkets,whichallowsforcomplexheterogeneouspreferences,butismoretractablethanthestandardmodel,yieldingrichcomparativestaticsandnewresultsonlargematchingmark

2、ets.WesimplifythestandardGaleandShapley(1962)modelintwoways.First,followingAumann(1964)weconsiderasettingwherea?nitenumberofagentsononeside(collegesor?rms)arematchedtoacontinuummassofagentsontheotherside(studentsorworkers).Second,weshowthat,inboththediscreteandcontinuummodel,stablemat

3、chingshaveaverysimplestructure,withcollegesacceptingstudentsrankedaboveathreshold,andstudentsdemandingtheirfavoritecollegethatwillacceptthem.Moreover,stablematchingsmaybefoundbysolvingforthresholdsthatbalancesupplyanddemandforcolleges.Wegivegeneralconditionsunderwhichthecontinuummodel

4、admitsauniquestablematching,incontrasttothestandarddiscretemodel.Thisstablematchingvariescontinuouslywiththeparametersofthemodel,andcomparativestaticsmaybederivedasincompetitiveequilibriumtheory,throughthemarketclearingequations.Moreover,givenasequenceoflargediscreteeconomiesconvergin

5、gtoalimiteconomy,thesetofstablematchingsofthediscreteeconomiesconvergestothestablematchingofthelimiteconomy.Weboundtherateofconvergenceofthesetofstablematchingsoflargediscreteeconomiestothecontinuumapproximation,andshowthatcomparativestaticsregard-ingtheuniquestablematchingofthecontin

6、uummodelextendtostrongsetorderingofthesetsofstablematchingsofapproximatingdiscreteeconomies.Wemodelthetransferrableutilitycase,asinBecker(1973).Wecharacterizethelimitofschoolchoicemechanismsusedinpractice,generalizingpreviousresultsofCheandKojima(2010).Finally,weillustratethemodel’sap

7、plicabilitybyquantifyinghowcompeti-tioninducedbyschoolchoicegivesschoolsincentivestoinvestinquality.Speci?cally,weshowthatschoolshavemuted,andpossiblyevennegativeincentivestoinvestinqualitydimensionsthatbene?tlowerrankedstudents.Date:February24,2012.Azevedo:Correspondingauthor,Harvard

8、Unive

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