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1、投資者調(diào)研與高管薪酬契約有效性研究李昊洋程小可李馨子北京交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院摘要:立足于信息不對(duì)稱視角,以深圳交易所2013-2015年上市公司為研究樣木,從薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性和薪酬粘性兩方面實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了投資者調(diào)研與高管薪酬契約右效性的關(guān)系,并進(jìn)一步考察公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)二者關(guān)系的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):投資者調(diào)研強(qiáng)度越大的公司,薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性越高而薪酬粘性越低,這種影響在公司不存在絕對(duì)控股股東時(shí)更為顯著;進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn),投資者調(diào)研通過(guò)提高財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量作用于高管薪酬契約。此外,相對(duì)于買方機(jī)構(gòu),賣方機(jī)構(gòu)的調(diào)研強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管
2、薪酬契約有效性的影響更顯著。關(guān)鍵詞:投資者調(diào)研;高管薪酬契約;薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性;薪酬粘性;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu);作者簡(jiǎn)介:李昊洋,北京交通大學(xué)博士生,主耍從事資本市場(chǎng)與公司治理研究,通訊作者聯(lián)系方式14113168@bjtu.edu.cn;作者簡(jiǎn)介:程小可,北京交通人學(xué)教授,博士生導(dǎo)師,主要從事權(quán)益定價(jià)研宂;作者簡(jiǎn)介:李繋子,屮央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)講師,主要從事上市公司信息披露、會(huì)計(jì)信息與資本市場(chǎng)研宄。收稿日期:2016-11-22基金:國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目“內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果:盈余質(zhì)量、權(quán)益價(jià)值與資本成本”(71272055);
3、國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目“市場(chǎng)化環(huán)境對(duì)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投資效率的影響研宄:宏微觀視角”(71572009):國(guó)家自然科學(xué)棊金面上項(xiàng)H“新興市場(chǎng)W家1FRS制定過(guò)程巾的博弈及經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究”(71372011)ResearchonInvestors'InvestigationandTopExecutiveCompensationContractEffectivenessLIHao—yangCHENGXiao-keLIXin_ziBeijingJiaotongUniversity;CentralUniversityofFinance
4、andEconomics;Abstract:Fromtheperspectiveofinformationasymmetry,takingthelistedcompaniesinShenzhenStockExchangefrom2013to2015assamples,thispaperconductsanempiricaltestontherelationshipbetweeninvestors’investigationandtheeffectivenessoftopexecutivecompensationcont
5、ractsfromthetwoaspects,i.e.,thesensitivitybetweencompensationandperformanceandthestickinessofcompensation,thenitfurtherexplorestheimpactofcorporateequitystructureontherelationshipbetweenthetwo.Theresultsshowthatthefirmswithgreaterintensityofinvestors'investigati
6、onwouldhavehighercompensation-performancesensitivityandlowerstickinessofcompensation.Thiskindofimpactismorenotableinthecompanieswithoutabsolutelycontrollingstockholders.Furthertestfindsoutthatinvestors'investigationwillactonthetopexecutivecompensationcontractsth
7、roughimprovingthequalityoffinancialreports.Inaddition,comparedwiththebuy-sideinstitutions,theinvestigationintensityofthesell-sideinstitutionshasamoresignificantimpactontheeffectivenessoftopexecutivecompensationcontracts.Keyword:investors'investigation;topexecuti
8、vecompensationcontract;sensitivitybetweencompensationandperformance;compensationsticky;equitystructure;Received:2016-11—22一、引言現(xiàn)代公司制度下所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離所導(dǎo)致的代理問(wèn)題作為公司治理的核心議題,一直是學(xué)